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Abstract:   
We investigate the empirical relation between competition and corporate governance 
and the effect of country characteristics on this relation. We find that competition is 
associated with strong corporate governance, but only in less developed countries. We 
next examine the impact of corporate governance on firm value given the level of 
competition. We find that competition and corporate governance appear to be 
complements in explaining firm value in developing countries, while in developed 
countries they are substitutes. 
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Does competition matter for corporate governance? The role of country 
characteristics 
1. Introduction 
Considerable evidence indicates that corporate governance affects firm performance (e.g., 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell, 2009). What factors influence corporate governance is thus an important question 
in corporate finance. An extensive literature investigates the firm- and country-level 
determinants of corporate governance (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 2000; Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Doidge, Karolyi, and 
Stulz, 2007). This literature documents that firm-level growth opportunities and external 
financing needs are relevant for corporate governance, as well as the level of investor 
protection in a country and a country’s level of economic and financial development. 
While the above firm- and country-level determinants of corporate governance have 
gained much attention over the last two decades, recent empirical studies consider the 
role of industry characteristics, particularly the extent of product market competition, in 
influencing corporate governance. Evidence from the U.S. (Giroud and Mueller, 2011) 
and other developed countries from the European Union (Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid, 
2011) suggests that firms in less competitive industries benefit more from good 
governance than do firms from competitive industries. These studies show that agency 
costs such as lower labour productivity, higher administrative expenses, and more value- 
destroying acquisitions are higher in less competitive industries. In competitive 
industries, in contrast, competition reduces these agency costs and increases firm 
efficiency.  
The evidence that corporate governance matters more in less competitive industries does 
not necessarily mean that firms from these industries are associated with better 
governance than firms from competitive industries. Using the 48 industry classification 
scheme of Fama and French (1997) and dividing their sample into competition quintiles, 
Giroud and Mueller (2011) find similar corporate governance ratings across the five 
quintiles. However, using the North American industry classification system’s (NAICS) 
1,170 industries, Chhaochharia, Grinstein, Grullon, and Michaely (2009) find that U.S. 
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firms from less competitive industries implement more governance mechanisms (e.g., 
fewer antitakeover restrictions and more independent boards) than U.S. firms from 
competitive industries. This conflicting evidence suggests that the empirical relation 
between competition and corporate governance has yet to be understood. 
Common to most empirical studies on competition and corporate governance is a focus 
on countries that are economically developed such as the U.S. Yet a country’s level of 
economic development influences firms’ corporate governance (Doidge et al., 2007), and 
thus could affect the relation between competition and corporate governance. Unlike 
studies on developed countries, however, research on developing countries has had to 
little to say about whether competition matters for corporate governance. Indeed, to the 
best of our knowledge no prior study has examined whether country factors influence the 
relation between competition and corporate governance, and whether the governance 
irrelevance documented in competitive industries in developed countries extends to 
competitive industries in developing countries. The objective of this paper is to fill this 
gap in the literature by examining these relations.  
We investigate the empirical relation between competition (weak, soft, and strong) and 
S&P corporate governance ratings for a large sample of firms from 38 countries. 
Partitioning the sample into developed and developing countries and controlling for other 
country variables such as investor protection and stock market capitalization, we find that 
firms from softly or weakly competitive industries have higher corporate governance 
ratings than firms from strongly competitive industries, but only in developed countries. 
In developing countries, competition is positively associated with corporate governance 
ratings. Moreover, firms from softly and weakly competitive industries have lower 
governance ratings than firms from strongly competitive industries. 
We attribute our findings above to two simultaneous effects of competition on corporate 
governance. On the one hand, competition reduces firm profits and in turn the internal 
capital available to finance new investments; in such a context, a firm that seeks external 
capital should improve its corporate governance as investors require protection in 
exchange for their capital (external financing effect). This effect is likely to be less 
pronounced if the country’s capital market is developed (as firms can access external 
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capital at a reasonable cost) or if the country has strong investor protection. In developing 
countries, however, where the capital market is narrow and external capital is expensive 
(Doidge et al., 2007), firms need to improve their governance to attract investors, 
particularly when their survival is threatened by intense competition. On the other hand, 
competition acts as a disciplinary mechanism by increasing managerial effort (Hart, 
1983) and hence investors should not require strong governance to monitor the managers 
of firms from competitive industries (managerial discipline effect). Our empirical results 
suggest that the disciplinary effect is dominant in developed countries, while the external 
financing effect dominates in developing countries. This evidence complements recent 
empirical studies on competition and governance for the U.S. (see Chhaochharia et al., 
2009) by showing that their results extend to a larger sample of developed countries but 
not to a sample of developing countries. 
We next examine the impact of the relation between competition and governance ratings 
on firm value. For developed countries, we find that firms from softly and weakly 
competitive industries benefit more from good governance than firms from strongly 
competitive industries. This evidence is consistent with the results of Giroud and Mueller 
(2011) for the U.S. and Ammann et al. (2011) for developed countries in the European 
Union, who also show that corporate governance is more valuable for firms in less 
competitive industries than for firms in competitive industries.  As Giroud and Mueller 
(2011) suggest, this evidence supports the view that corporate governance and 
competition are substitutes. For developing countries, we find that corporate governance 
significantly increases firm value not only in softly and weakly competitive industries but 
also (indeed, mostly) in strongly competitive industries, suggesting that competition 
complements corporate governance. 
We contribute to the growing literature on competition and governance in several ways. 
First, while most studies in this literature focus on a single country (Januszewski, Köke, 
and Winter, 2001; Giroud and Mueller, 2010, 2011; Chhaochharia et al., 2009; Karuna, 
2010) or on a handful of developed countries from the European Union (Ammann et al., 
2011), we provide evidence for a wide set of firms from developed and developing 
countries. Further, we highlight the role that the level of economic development plays in 
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the relation between competition and governance. Finally, for a given level of 
competition, we show how the effect of corporate governance on firm value varies with 
the level of economic development. We also contribute to the literature on developing 
economies by extending this literature to the context of competition and governance. To 
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the impact of the relation 
between competition and governance on firm value for a wide set of developed and 
developing countries. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of the literature on 
competition, managerial incentives, and governance, and we develop our hypotheses. In 
Section 3, we describe our sample construction and empirical measures. In Section 4, we 
investigate both the relation between competition and governance and the influence of 
country characteristics on this relation. In Section 5, we examine the impact of this 
relation on firm value. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
In a recent paper, Giroud and Mueller (2011) review the theoretical literature on the 
implications of product market competition for managerial slack and the need to give 
managers monetary incentives. The authors conclude that the theorized effect of 
competition on managerial incentives is ambiguous and thus the benefits of incentivizing 
managers through good governance may be either weaker or stronger in competitive 
industries.   
Recently, financial economists have empirically examined the relation between 
competition and corporate governance. Using U.S. data, Giroud and Mueller (2011) show 
that agency costs (lower labour productivity, higher input costs, and value-destroying 
acquisitions) are higher in less competitive industries but that good governance helps 
reduce these costs, increasing firm value in these industries. Chhaochharia et al. (2009) 
further document that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which aimed to enhance internal 
corporate governance, led to an increase in firm efficiency, but mostly in less competitive 
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industries, suggesting that corporate governance does indeed mitigate agency costs in 
these industries.1 
While prior work has established that increased competition reduces agency costs, the 
impact of competition on the quality of corporate governance remains a puzzle. If 
competition reduces agency costs, the need to provide managers with incentives through 
good governance should be lower. Giroud and Mueller (2011) show that the distributions 
of corporate governance ratings are similar across competitive and less competitive 
industries. But Chhaochharia et al. (2009) find that firms in less competitive industries 
have better corporate governance ratings. This suggests that further research is required to 
establish the empirical relation between competition and corporate governance. 
In this study, we argue that country characteristics can influence the relation between 
competition and corporate governance. This argument is motivated by the view that 
countries matter for firms’ decision to invest in corporate governance. Doidge et al. 
(2007, p. 3), for example, argue that  
“countries matter because they influence the costs that firms incur to bond 
themselves to good governance and the benefits from doing so…. However, 
mechanisms to do so could be unavailable or prohibitively expensive in countries 
with poor state investor protection or poor economic and financial 
development…. Perhaps, the most important benefit of good governance is access 
to capital markets on better terms. But this benefit is worth less to a firm in a 
country with poor financial development because that firm will obtain less 
funding from the capital markets and hence will benefit less from any governance-
related reduction in the cost of funds. Consequently, firms in countries with low 
financial and economic development will find it optimal to invest less in 
governance and the rights of minority shareholders will be mostly determined at 
the country level rather than at the firm level.”  
                                                            
1 Karuna (2010) finds a more complex relation:  corporate governance ratings increase and then decrease as 
competition (measured using 4-digit SIC codes) increases, suggesting a non-linear relation. 
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Doidge et al. (2007) show that country characteristics explain more of the cross-sectional 
variation in governance ratings than observable firm characteristics. In addition, they find 
that while firm characteristics are relevant in developed countries, they do not explain 
corporate governance ratings in developing countries. In this study we investigate 
whether product market competition, an industry characteristic, is a relevant determinant 
of firm-level governance. We also investigate what role, if any, country characteristics 
play in the relation between competition and corporate governance. 
Following Alchian (1950), Stigler (1958), and Machlup (1967), we expect that 
competition reduces firm profits and induces more effort from managers to minimize 
costs. The reduction in profits has two effects on corporate governance. On the one hand, 
it reduces the amount of internal financing available to invest in new projects, and hence 
increases the need for external financing. But the main reason outside investors provide 
external financing to firms is to receive control rights in exchange (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997), which increases the need for good governance. On the other hand, the reduction in 
profits increases managers’ effort to maximize firm value (or minimize costs), which 
decreases the need for good governance. 
The first argument above is that competition affects corporate governance through 
external financing needs. Consistent with Doidge et al. (2007), who argue that the benefit 
of good governance is access to stock markets on better terms, a firm with good 
governance should be able to access external financing at lower cost and thus not need 
stronger governance. Consequently, in countries with good governance, firms should 
have lower need for stronger governance when they face more intense competition. In 
contrast, in countries with weak governance, firms should have greater need for stronger 
governance in the face of more intense competition. This latter effect corresponds largely 
to developing countries, where firms invest less in corporate governance, while the 
former effect is more characteristic of developed countries.2 This leads to our first 
hypothesis: 
                                                            
2 This argument does not necessarily mean that firms in developing countries will have better governance 
than those in developed countries. Rather, it suggests that if firms are in need of external finance, 
improvements in corporate governance will be more pronounced for firms in developing countries than for 
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Hypothesis I: The impact of competition on corporate governance is strong (weak) in 
developing (developed) countries, ceteris paribus. 
The second argument discussed above is that competition increases managerial effort and 
thus acts as a disciplinary mechanism encouraging value-maximization. Therefore, the 
governance of firms from competitive industries will not need to be strong (Giroud and 
Mueller, 2011), while the governance of firms in less competitive industries, where the 
lack of competition fails to discipline managers, should be stronger. This argument runs 
counter to the argument of the external financing effect, which holds that competition 
may induce good governance through external financing needs. Depending on which 
effect (external financing or managerial discipline) dominates, firms from competitive 
industries may have stronger or weaker governance. For developed countries, we expect 
the external financing effect to be lower than the managerial discipline effect since, on 
average, firms have good governance and external financing is available at lower cost. 
Our second hypothesis is thus as follows: 
Hypothesis II: In developed countries, firms from less competitive industries have 
stronger governance than firms from competitive industries (managerial discipline effect 
dominates), ceteris paribus. 
For developing countries, the reduction in profits due to competition and the increased 
need for external financing that results induce the firm to implement good governance. 
However, the managerial discipline effect reduces the need for good governance. 
Therefore, a priori it is not clear whether firms from competitive industries will have 
weaker or stronger governance than firms from less competitive industries. We argue that 
in developing countries the external financing effect dominates the managerial discipline 
effect. The greatest benefit of good corporate governance is access to external capital at 
lower cost. Therefore, firms in competitive industries that need to raise external capital 
should improve their corporate governance. In contrast, when competition is weak, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
firms in developed countries. The initial level of corporate governance is determined by country attributes, 
which on average induce stronger corporate governance in developed countries than in developing 
countries (Doidge et al., 2007). 
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corporate governance should improve (disciplinary effect); but firms will not have 
incentives to improve their governance because strong governance mechanisms are costly 
to implement (Doidge et. al., 2007), and these firms face less pressure to raise external 
capital since they generate profits/internal financing. As a result, firms in less competitive 
industries will have weaker corporate governance. This discussion leads to our third 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis III: In developing countries, firms from competitive industries will have 
stronger governance than firms from less competitive industries (external financing effect 
dominates), ceteris paribus. 
If competition induces better governance in developing countries, as stated in Hypothesis 
III, then firms from competitive industries should benefit from an increase in 
competition-related governance. Indeed, if good corporate governance is associated with 
greater firm value (Gompers et al., 2003), and if competition induces stronger 
governance, then firms in competitive industries domiciled in developing countries 
should benefit from good governance. In developed countries, however, competition has 
a limited impact on governance (Hypothesis II) and hence a firm may not benefit from 
competition-related governance, in which case governance will be most valuable for 
weakly competitive firms that have stronger governance. Our fourth hypothesis is thus as 
follows: 
Hypothesis IV: In developing countries corporate governance increases firm value 
primarily in competitive industries (higher external financing effect), while in developed 
countries corporate governance increases firm value primarily in less competitive 
industries (lower managerial discipline effect), ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis IV suggests that in developing countries competition and corporate 
governance are complements in explaining firm performance, while in developed 
countries they are substitutes. In the following sections, we investigate whether any of the 
four hypotheses above find empirical support. 
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3. Data and variables  
Our data collection begins with firms included in the S&P Transparency and Disclosure 
ratings. We collect firm-level data from Worldscope. Industry concentration measures 
come from Bureau van Dijk ORBIS, and country variables come from the World 
Development Indicators database. Variables are described in Table I. 
[Insert Table I about here] 
3.1 Corporate governance sample 
To investigate the relation between competition and corporate governance, we use the 
S&P Transparency and Disclosure ratings. These ratings were issued in 2001 for 1,443 
firms from around the world. The ratings were compiled through examination of year 
2000 annual reports and SEC filings. A firm receives a value of one each time it meets 
one of 98 disclosure requirements and zero otherwise. The requirements are divided into 
three categories: 28 requirements on ownership structure and investor rights, 35 
requirements on board structure and process, and 35 requirements on financial 
transparency and information disclosure. The summed scores are then converted into a 
percentage, with a higher percentage indicating better disclosure. These ratings have 
recently been used in the financial economics literature. For example, Khanna, Palepu, 
and Srinivasan (2004) evaluate whether foreign companies’ interaction with U.S. product, 
labor, and financial markets are related to their disclosure and governance practices. 
Durnev and Kim (2005) investigate how firm characteristics and country legal 
environment affect disclosure practices. Doidge et al. (2007) examine the effect of 
country characteristics on corporate governance.  
We exclude U.S. firms because the S&P Transparency and Disclosure ratings “use US 
disclosure standards as an implicit benchmark; therefore, they measure the degree of 
similarity of a company’s disclosure practices to US practices” (Khanna et al., 2004, p. 
503). Throughout the paper, we refer to the S&P Transparency and Disclosure ratings as 
corporate governance ratings or simply ratings for the sake of simplicity. After 
excluding financial firms, our final sample comprises 682 firms from 38 developed and 
developing countries. Table II reports descriptive statistics for the S&P corporate 
governance ratings. Firms with the highest ratings are from Finland (75.69), Ireland 
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(75.25), and the United Kingdom (71.22) while firms with the lowest ratings are from 
Colombia (19.15), Taiwan (21.63), and Peru (23.26). The sample standard deviation is 
16.54, with minimum and maximum ratings of 5.21 and 88.78, respectively. Taken 
together, these statistics indicate that there are important cross-country variations in 
corporate governance ratings.   
[Insert Table II about here] 
3.2 Product market competition 
To examine whether industry characteristics explain corporate governance ratings, we 
collect data on sales from Bureau van Dijk ORBIS, which covers public and private 
companies worldwide. Our main measure of competition relies on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), a measure of industry concentration that is defined as the sum of 
squared firms’ market shares in industry i and year t, 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡2𝑁𝑖𝑗=1 ,                                                                      (1) 
where 𝑁𝑖 is the number of firms (j) in the industry. HHIs are computed at the two-digit 
SIC code level. We exclude observations with negative or missing values on sales. 
Recent multinational studies consider firm clustering at the two-digit SIC code level (see, 
e.g., Guadalupe and Pérez-González, 2010; Ammann et al., 2011). In robustness checks, 
we consider HHI clustering at the three-, and four-digit SIC code level. To obtain our 
measure of competition, we subtract HHI from one (i.e., 1-HHI) so that high values 
indicate strong competition. 
To evaluate the effect of competition on corporate governance for various competition 
levels, we follow Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) and divide our sample by competition 
terciles. We define strongly, softly, and weakly competitive industries as industries with 
(1-HHI) in the highest, middle, and lowest terciles of the empirical (1-HHI) distribution.3 
                                                            
3 Generally, markets with HHI below 0.1 are considered more competitive, while markets with HHI above 
0.18 are less competitive (Bergh and Camesasca, 2001). The HHI tercile cut-offs in our sample are 0.08 
and 0.21, which are below and above 0.1 and 0.18, respectively. Thus, we believe that our competition 
levels are accurate. 
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3.3 Country characteristics 
We measure economic development using the logarithm of gross national product per 
capita from the World Development Indicators database. As a measure of stock market 
development, we use a country’s stock market capitalization scaled by its gross domestic 
product. This variable comes from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) and is available on 
the World Bank website. 
To capture a country’s investor protection, we multiply shareholder rights by law and 
order (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Doidge et al., 2007). Our shareholder rights measure is the 
revised anti-director rights index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008) and our law and order measure comes from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG).  Following Doidge et al. (2007), we split our sample into developed and 
developing countries, with developed (developing) countries comprising those countries 
that have gross national product per capita above (below) the sample median.  
Panel A of Table III presents the distribution of corporate governance ratings across 
levels of economic development. On average developed countries have a corporate 
governance rating of 60.17, while developing countries have a governance rating of 
40.21. Among developing countries, corporate governance ratings decline, on average, 
from 45.51 in strongly competitive industries to 36.96 in weakly competitive industries. 
We observe a different pattern among developed countries, with corporate governance 
ratings increasing, on average, from 56.35 in strongly competitive industries to 62.82 in 
softly competitive industries before decreasing slightly to 60.77 in weakly competitive 
industries.  
Results of mean difference tests suggest that firms from developed countries have, on 
average, higher corporate governance ratings than firms from developing countries, and 
that this difference does not change across levels of competition. This evidence supports 
Doidge et al.’s (2007) finding that firms in developing countries invest less in corporate 
governance than firms in developed countries. Panel B of Table III shows that this 
evidence does not stem from a higher level of competition and in turn a stronger 
disciplinary effect since the means of our competition measure across levels of economic 
development do not differ significantly. The mean difference in competition between 
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developed (0.81) and developing (0.80) countries is not statistically significant, which 
indicates that industries are not less competitive in developed than in developing 
countries. This suggests that country characteristics account for the distribution of 
corporate governance across competition levels, as shown in Panel A of Table III. 
[Insert Table III about here] 
3.4 Firm and industry characteristics 
We control for firm-specific determinants of corporate governance such as sales growth, 
ownership concentration, firm size, cash holdings, and foreign sales (Durnev and Kim, 
2005; Doidge et al., 2007). We obtain firm-level data from Worldscope /Datastream and 
for 2000, the year of the corporate governance ratings.  
Sales growth is measured as the two-year geometric average of annual inflation-adjusted 
growth in net sales. We winsorize sales growth at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the 
impact of outliers. We expect this variable to positively affect corporate governance 
ratings (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Doidge et al., 2007).  
Note that sales growth, a proxy for firm growth opportunities, may be affected by a 
country’s institutions and business conditions. We therefore use the dependence on 
external finance as an alternative measure of growth opportunities, as it is computed from 
U.S. data and thus unrelated to country business conditions (Doidge et al., 2007). More 
specifically, using data for U.S. firms from Compustat, we first compute firm-level 
dependence on external finance as the five-year sum of capital expenditures minus the 
five-year sum of cash flows divided by the five-year sum of capital expenditures. We 
then construct the dependence on external finance as the median across all firms in the 
same industry (defined at the two-digit SIC code level). Next, we match U.S. and foreign 
firms at the industry level. Finally, we assign the industry median (from U.S. industries) 
to each of our sample firms with the same two-digit SIC code. The dependence on 
external finance should be positively related to corporate governance ratings. 
The ownership concentration variable is the number of closely held shares divided by 
common shares outstanding. In Worldscope, closely held shares comprise (1) shares held 
by insiders, including senior corporate officers, directors, and their immediate families, 
14 
 
(2) shares held in trusts, (3) shares held by another corporation (except shares held in a 
fiduciary capacity by financial institutions), (4) shares held by pension/benefit plans, and 
(5) shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of shares outstanding. Controlling 
shareholders divert less of the firm’s cash flows when their ownership in the firm is high 
(Doidge et al., 2007; Lombardo and Pagano, 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). 
Therefore, ownership concentration is likely to be negatively related to governance 
ratings. Doidge et al. (2007) use closely held shares to proxy for ownership concentration 
and find that it is significantly negatively related to the S&P corporate governance ratings 
in developed countries but unrelated to the S&P corporate governance ratings in 
developing countries.  
We measure firm size using the logarithm of total assets. We scale cash holdings by total 
assets to control for firm size because larger firms are likely to have larger cash holdings. 
Generally, the literature expects the relations between corporate governance ratings and 
firm size and cash holdings to be positive because large firms and firms with a large 
amount of cash can more easily meet the costs of implementing corporate governance.  
However, firms that have just raised external capital to finance growth opportunities 
would have higher cash holdings, in which case cash holdings should be positively 
related to governance ratings, while firms with greater cash holdings are less likely to 
raise external finance, in which case cash holdings could be negatively related to 
governance ratings (Doidge et al., 2007). We measure international competition as 
foreign sales/total sales. We expect foreign sales/total sales to be positively related to 
corporate governance because more global companies may feel more compelled to adopt 
global governance standards (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu, 2006). 
We also include a dummy variable (ADR) to control for cross-listing because ADR firms 
are likely to have higher corporate governance ratings. ADR takes the value of one if the 
firm is listed on a major U.S. exchange (that is, ADR levels II and III) and zero 
otherwise. The ADR variable excludes firms listed through Rule 144A and over-the-
counter listings since these listed ADR programs are exempt from U.S. reporting 
requirements (unlike ADR levels II and III). Information on cross-listing comes from the 
Bank of New York, Citibank, NYSE, NASDAQ, and JP Morgan. 
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4. Empirical relation between product-market competition and corporate 
governance 
In this section, we report regression results on the relation between competition and 
corporate governance and we examine how country characteristics affect this relation. 
We then report results on the nonlinearity of this relation. Finally, we present results for a 
series of robustness tests. 
4.1 Does competition matter for corporate governance? 
We consider the following econometric specification: 
𝐶𝐺𝑗 = 𝛽′�𝑑𝑒𝑣 × 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗� + 𝜃′𝐹𝑗 + 𝛿′𝐶𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗 ,                                               (2) 
where 𝐶𝐺𝑗 is the S&P corporate governance rating for firm j, competition is calculated as 
one minus HHI, where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for firm j’s industry and 
measures industry concentration, 𝑑𝑒𝑣 is a (2×1) vector of development dummies whose 
first and second rows pertain to developed and developing countries, respectively, 𝐹𝑗 is a 
vector of firm-level variables (sales growth, dependence on external finance, the 
logarithm of assets, ownership concentration, cash holdings to assets, the ratio of foreign 
sales to total sales), and 𝐶𝑘 is a vector of country-level variables (stock market 
capitalization, investor protection, developed countries dummy).4 The developed 
countries dummy is included to control for any direct effect of economic development. If 
firms in developed countries have stronger incentives to practice good governance as 
discussed in Section 2, then the developed countries dummy should have a positive 
coefficient.  
 
The results in column (1) of Table IV show that competition has a significant effect on 
corporate governance ratings only in developing countries. Each standard deviation 
increase in competition raises corporate governance ratings by 1.89, a 3.63% increase 
over a sample mean of 51.81. These results suggest that competition has a different 
impact on governance ratings depending on whether the country is developed or 
developing. In Section 2, we identify two possible effects of competition on corporate 
                                                            
4 For an example of such an econometric specification, see Giroud and Mueller (2011), who evaluate the 
impact of corporate governance on firm value in competitive and less competitive industries.  
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governance: while competition increases the need for stronger governance through the 
demand for external financing, it reduces the need for stronger governance through 
managerial discipline. The evidence in Table IV suggests that the first effect dominates 
in developing countries, while no effect seems to prevail in developed countries. These 
findings support Hypothesis I, which posits that the impact of competition on corporate 
governance is strong in developing countries, while in developed countries its impact is 
weak. As our list of country-level variables is unlikely to be exhaustive, in column (2) of 
Table IV we report results of country fixed effects regressions.  We find that the impact 
of competition on corporate governance ratings continues to be strong in developing 
countries and weak in developed countries. 
 
The results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table IV further suggest that firms in 
developed countries have higher corporate governance ratings than those in developing 
countries. This finding is consistent with the view that developed countries invest more in 
corporate governance than developing countries (Doidge et al., 2007; Aggarwal, Erel, 
Stulz, and Williamson, 2009). Indeed, we find that the ratings of firms in developed 
countries exceed those of firms in developing countries by 10.85. This result continues to 
hold in country fixed effects regressions. All the control variables display the expected 
signs. In particular, corporate governance ratings increase with the log of assets, foreign 
sales/total sales, country-level investor protection, and country-level stock market 
capitalization, but decrease with ownership concentration. 
Overall, the above results support our hypothesis that competition matters for corporate 
governance, particularly in developing countries (Hypothesis I). One explanation for the 
insignificant effect of competition on corporate governance in developed countries is that 
the competition measure captures two opposing effects – the external financing effect and 
the managerial discipline effect – which are not expected to work equally in competitive 
and less competitive industries. Indeed, the descriptive statistics shown in Panel A of 
Table III suggest that the relation between competition and corporate governance might 
be non-linear. We investigate this possible explanation in the following section. 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
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4.2 Is the relation between competition and corporate governance non-linear? 
In this section, we investigate whether the relation between competition and corporate 
governance varies with the degree of competition. We begin by dividing the sample into 
competition terciles (strongly, softly, and weakly competitive). We then estimate the 
following regression equation: 
𝐶𝐺𝑗 =   𝛽1𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛾′𝐹𝑗 + 𝛿′𝐶𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗 ,                (3) 
where 𝐶𝐺𝑗, 𝐹𝑗, and 𝐶𝑘 are the same as in equation (2); 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 and  
𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 are dummy variables that take the value of one if the firm’s industry 
is softly or weakly competitive, and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table I. 
Hypothesis II posits that for developed countries, firms in less competitive industries will 
have higher corporate governance ratings than firms in competitive industries; 
Hypothesis III on developing countries states the opposite. Hence, we expect the 
competition dummy coefficients to be positive (negative) for developed (developing) 
countries. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table V report the results for developed countries. On average, 
firms from softly competitive industries have 3.68 higher corporate governance ratings 
than firms from strongly competitive industries; however, the regression coefficient on 
the dummy for weakly competitive industries is not significant (see column (1)). When 
we include country fixed effects (column (2)), the coefficient on the softly competitive 
dummy remains significant and the coefficient on the weakly competitive dummy 
becomes marginally significant. This finding suggests that the link between competition 
and corporate governance varies with the level of industry competition.  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table V report the estimates of equation (3) for developing 
countries. The competition dummy coefficients are all negative. On average, firms from 
softly and weakly competitive industries have respectively 14.63 and 10.56 lower 
corporate governance ratings than firms from strongly competitive industries (column 
(3)). The coefficients on the competition dummies increase from softly to weakly 
competitive industries, indicating that corporate governance ratings decrease from 
strongly to softly competitive industries and then increase slightly to weakly competitive 
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industries. In column (4), the inclusion of country fixed effects strongly reduces the t-
statistics and coefficients on the competition dummies, but the coefficient on softly 
competitive dummy remains (weakly) significant. This result suggests that a non-linear 
relation between competition and corporate governance also holds for developing 
countries. Furthermore, we note that the adjusted 𝑅2 is now four times greater than that in 
the specification without country fixed effects in column (3), suggesting that 
unobservable country characteristics are important in developing countries. 
In summary, the evidence from Table V support Hypothesis III, which posits that in 
developing countries firms from competitive industries have better corporate governance 
than firms from less competitive industries. The evidence also supports Hypothesis II, 
which posits that in developed countries firms from competitive industries have weaker 
governance ratings than firms from less competitive industries.  
The results from Table V are consistent with prior studies that find different evidence for 
developed and developing countries. Doidge et al. (2007) show that firm characteristics 
are not useful in explaining corporate governance ratings for developing countries, but 
are relevant for developed countries. Corporate governance ratings are negatively related 
to ownership and positively related to firm size, cash holdings, foreign sales, and the need 
for external finance (an industry characteristic), but only for developed countries. For 
developing countries, none of the firm variables significantly explains corporate 
governance ratings. 
While firm-level variables appear to be irrelevant for corporate governance ratings in 
developing countries, country-level variables explain corporate governance ratings in 
both developed and developing countries. The results suggest that incentives to invest in 
firm-level governance are greater with better country investor protection whatever the 
level of economic development. Stock market capitalization/GDP is positively associated 
with corporate governance ratings, but only in developing countries. These results 
support the view that the benefit of a governance-related reduction in the cost of capital 
increases with financial development and investor protection (Doidge et al., 2007). For 
developed countries, GNP per capita has a negative and significant coefficient. As noted 
by Doidge et al. (2007), this evidence is puzzling since we would expect incentives to 
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invest in firm-level governance to increase with economic development (see the 
developed countries dummy in Table IV). However, in corporate governance systems that 
focus more on large shareholders (e.g., business groups5) and less on investors’ rights, 
firms finance internally and the rights of minority shareholders could be weaker (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). The presence of such countries can influence our results only if they 
contribute heavily to the sample size. This is the case for Japan, which accounts for 
almost one-fourth of the sample (125 out of 416 firms). In unreported results (available 
from the authors), we find that when we exclude Japan from the sample, GNP per capita 
becomes insignificant and our findings on competition and other firm-level variables 
remain qualitatively similar.  
[Insert Table V about here] 
4.3 Robustness tests 
In the following subsections we provide results from robustness tests on the relation 
between competition and corporate governance. 6 
4.3.1 Alternative measures of competition  
In this section, we test whether our evidence continues to hold when we use two 
alternative measures of competition. First, we use a firm’s price-cost margin (PCM), an 
empirical proxy for the Lerner index, which measures the extent to which a firm can set 
prices above its marginal costs (see Giroud and Mueller, 2010). We construct PCM as net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. We trim the PCM to ensure that 
all values fall inside the theoretical bounds of zero and one. A PCM close to one indicates 
that the firm faces weak competition, while a firm that faces strong competition would 
have a PCM near zero.  
Panel A of Table VI presents results for PCM terciles constructed following the same 
method that we use to construct competition terciles: strongly, softly, and weakly 
competitive firms are firms with a PCM in the lowest, middle, and highest PCM terciles. 
                                                            
5 In Japan, business groups are organized into keiretsus, groups of firms that own control blocks in each 
other and allow the keiretsu bank to play a major role in corporate financing and managerial enforcement 
(Berglof and Perotti, 1994; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). 
6 The unreported results mentioned in this section are available from the authors upon request. 
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The results for the competition dummies based on the PCM results are similar to those 
obtained using the concentration measure (i.e., 1-HHI) although the coefficients on the 
dummies are smaller. 
Our second alternative measure of competition is the four-firms concentration ratio 
(CONC), computed as the total market share of the four largest firms in each two-digit 
SIC code industry. Like HHI, CONC measures the extent of market control by larger 
firms. However, CONC gives less weight to larger firms than HHI. This measure has 
been used in recent studies (e.g., Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Karuna, 2010). As with the 
other measures, we split the sample into terciles according to the empirical CONC 
distribution. The results using CONC, reported in Panel B of Table VI, are comparable to 
those based on HHI. For developed countries (column (3)), only softly competitive firms 
have significantly higher corporate governance ratings than strongly competitive firms. 
For developing countries (column (4)), corporate governance ratings are significantly 
lower for softly and weakly competitive firms. The evidence in Panels A and B of Table 
VI provides further support for our predictions, and suggests that our findings are not 
driven by the choice of competition measure. 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
4.3.2 Alternative corporate governance ratings 
To assess whether our findings are particular to the S&P measure, we consider alternative 
corporate governance ratings drawn from Institutional Investor Services (ISS) and Credit 
Lyonnais Security Asia (CLSA). 
ISS started providing corporate governance ratings in 2002 for U.S. companies and in 
2003 for non-U.S. companies. ISS compiles ratings by examining firms’ annual reports, 
regulatory filings, and websites. The ratings are based on 64 governance attributes for 
U.S. firms and 55 attributes for firms outside the U.S. For each attribute, a firm receives a 
one if it meets the attribute’s implementation threshold, and zero otherwise7. We follow 
Aggarwal et al. (2009) and retain only the 44 attributes that are common to both U.S. and 
foreign firms. The 44 attributes cover four categories: Board (25 attributes), Audit (3 
                                                            
7 For more details on the ISS ratings, see Aggarwal et al. (2009). 
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attributes), Anti-takeover (6 attributes), and Compensation and Ownership (10 attributes). 
We focus on 2005 because this year is associated with more firms and fewer missing firm 
attributes than earlier years (Aggarwal et al., 2009). The ISS ratings mostly cover 
developed countries.8  
The CLSA corporate governance ratings, for 2000, were issued in 2001 for firms across 
global emerging markets (Gill, 2001). Selection criteria were firm size and investor 
interest, and firm ratings were based on responses by financial analysts to 57 questions 
divided into seven categories: management discipline, transparency, independence, 
accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility. The first six categories 
were given a weight of 15% in the corporate governance index and the last was given a 
weight of 10%. 
We report the results using the alternative measures of corporate governance in Panel C 
of Table VI. The results for the ISS sample (column (5)) are consistent with both 
Hypothesis II and the results above for developed countries in the S&P sample. The 
competition dummies indicate that on average firms from softly and weakly competitive 
industries have respectively 2.91 and 5.14 larger ISS governance ratings than those of 
firms from strongly competitive industries. For the CLSA sample (column (6)), the 
regression coefficients on the competition dummies suggest that firms from less 
competitive industries generally have lower corporate governance ratings than firms from 
competitive industries. Firms from weakly competitive industries exhibit CLSA 
governance ratings that on average are 6.32 lower than those of firms from strongly 
competitive industries. The dummy for softly competitive industries takes the expected 
negative coefficient, but is not statistically significant. Overall, the evidence from the 
CLSA sample is similar to that reported in Table V for developing countries in the S&P 
sample. 
For the ISS sample, ownership concentration, cash to assets, foreign sales, and country 
investor protection are significantly related to the ratings, but the dependence on external 
                                                            
8 The ISS corporate governance ratings are used in recent empirical studies (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009; 
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos, 2011). For other uses of the CLSA ratings, please see Durnev and 
Kim (2005) and Doidge et al. (2007). 
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finance and log of assets are not. In unreported regressions, we control for country fixed 
effects. The results are similar, but cash to assets becomes insignificant while the log of 
assets now takes a positive and significant coefficient, and the adjusted 𝑅2 rises to 0.66. 
For the CLSA sample, firm characteristics such as sales growth, the dependence on 
external finance, and foreign sales help explain governance ratings. Further, at the 
country level, stock market capitalization is not significant. When we control for country 
fixed effects (results are not reported), all firm variables that were significant lose their 
explanatory power; however, we obtain similar results for the competition dummies, and 
the adjusted 𝑅2increases from 0.22 to 0.49. 
4.3.3 Other robustness tests 
One important concern with our analysis above is that the construction of the governance 
data might introduce endogeneity in the regressions. The S&P corporate governance 
ratings were reported in 2001 for year 2000. It could be the case that corporate 
governance provisions implemented before 2000 already affected some firm 
characteristics when the ratings were constructed. To address this concern, we re-run 
regression equation (3) for developed and developing countries using firm-, industry-, 
and country-level variables dating back to 1999. In doing so, we control for the possible 
influence of corporate governance provisions on the explanatory variables. We report the 
results in Panel D of Table VI. In short, our inferences remain the same. Firms in softly 
and weakly competitive industries have higher (lower) governance ratings in developed 
(developing) countries, and coefficients on the firm and country variables exhibit similar 
coefficients to those based on the data for 2000. 
Another concern is that competition measures built at the two-digit SIC code level may 
include too many unrelated firms in the same industry.9 To examine the robustness of our 
results to the choice of industry classification, we investigate the relation between 
competition and corporate governance ratings using industries classified at the three-digit 
                                                            
9 Constructing competition measures for small industries poses several challenges. Competition intensity 
may not be treated as exogenous since one firm’s action can affect the rivalry in the product market. This is 
likely the case in economically less developed countries with only a few firms in several industries. Further, 
in narrow industry classifications some firms that are related may be classified into different industries. For 
example, at the four-digit SIC code level, cane sugar except refining (SIC 2061) and cane sugar refining 
(SIC 2062) are treated as unrelated although they might actually compete with each other. 
23 
 
and four-digit SIC code levels. We also construct the dependence on external finance, 
which is an industry measure, at the three-digit and four-digit SIC code levels. We report 
the results of our estimation of equation (3) in Panels E and F of Table VI. We find that 
we obtain qualitatively similar results for all three industry classifications (three-digit, 
four-digit, and two-digit SIC code levels), and thus our results are not driven by the 
choice of industry classification scheme.  
We next examine whether other firm characteristics often used in the literature could 
influence the relation that we document between competition and corporate governance 
ratings. Research and development is often used as a measure of capital intangibility. 
Intangibles are harder to monitor, and firms with a higher proportion of intangible capital 
tend to implement stronger corporate governance (Durnev and Kim, 2005). Research and 
development data are missing for several firms in 2000. Since companies with a higher 
proportion of intangibles may have different characteristics (e.g., they may be growth 
companies), omitting them may introduce a bias in the sample. We follow Durnev and 
Kim (2005) by replacing the missing values with zero. We also include two variables 
used in the governance literature (Lins, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2011), namely, capital 
expenditures and leverage. Capital expenditures capture the funds used to acquire fixed 
assets other than those related to acquisitions. In Worldscope, capital expenditures 
include additions to property, plant, and equipment (PPE) and investment in machinery 
and equipment. Investment in fixed capital that has been financed through external capital 
should be positively related to corporate governance. As a measure of leverage, we use 
total debt to assets to account for the fact that creditors may act as external monitors 
(Lins, 2003). When we estimate equation (3) including the three variables above, our 
evidence, reported in Panel G of Table VI, remains unchanged. (Note that in this 
regression, industries are classified at the two-digit SIC code level.) Research and 
development is positively related to governance ratings in developed countries but not in 
developing countries. Capital expenditures and total debt do not appear to be related to 
corporate governance in developed or developing countries. More importantly, the 
competition dummies are not affected by the inclusion of these variables in the 
regression. 
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Our next test investigates whether our argument that the relation between competition 
and corporate governance is non-linear holds when we employ an alternative econometric 
specification. In particular, we estimate equation (3) by replacing the competition 
dummies with the competition variable and its square.10 The results in Panel H of Table 
VI show that the effect of a change in competition on governance ratings is greater at 
higher levels of competition than at lower levels. The competition variable is always 
significant at the 10% level while its square is significant at the 5% level. In developed 
countries stronger competition is associated with lower governance ratings (the marginal 
impact of competition is -14.40, evaluated at the mean level of competition for developed 
countries of 0.81), whereas in developing countries stronger competition is related to 
higher governance ratings (the marginal impact is 27.01 evaluated at the mean of 0.80). 
While these findings provide support for a non-linear relation, they highlight the 
difference in dynamics across development levels: for developed countries, the negative 
managerial disciplinary effect dominates, which explains the concavity of the relation, 
while for developing countries the positive external financing effect is responsible for the 
convexity of the relation. 
In summary, the results of this section suggest that our findings are robust to the use of 
alternative measures of competition and alternative corporate governance ratings. 
Moreover, our results continue to hold if we classify industries at the three-digit and four-
digit code levels, if we include other firm characteristics, and if we use a different 
econometric specification. 
5. Product market competition, corporate governance, and firm valuation 
In previous sections, we establish that the impact of product market competition on 
corporate governance varies with the level of economic development. We show that 
competition positively affects governance in developing countries, while it negatively 
affects governance in developed countries. However, the finding that competition 
improves governance in developing countries does not necessarily mean that 
competition-related governance will be relevant for firm value. Using U.S. data, Giroud 
and Mueller (2011) find that corporate governance is more valuable for firms in less 
                                                            
10 See Karuna (2010) for a similar econometric specification. 
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competitive industries than for firms in competitive industries.  Our Hypothesis IV posits 
that in developing (developed) countries, firms from competitive (less competitive) 
industries will benefit more from good governance. In this section, we investigate 
whether the data support this hypothesis. 
We measure firm value using Tobin’s Q, which we define as the market value of equity 
minus the book value of equity plus total assets divided by total assets. To reduce 
possible endogeneity related to firms with a good valuation having higher governance 
ratings, we calculate Tobin’s Q for 2001, in contrast to the explanatory variables based on 
2000 (Durnev and Kim, 2005). Following Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011), we estimate 
the following equations: 
𝑄𝑗 = 𝛼 + � 𝑑𝑖𝐼−1
𝑖=1
+ 𝛽′�𝐼𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐼 ∗ 𝐶𝐺𝑗� + 𝛾′𝐹𝑗 + 𝛿′𝐶𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗 ,                                              (4) 
𝑄𝑗 = 𝛼 + � 𝑑𝑖𝐼−1
𝑖=1
+ � 𝜏𝑘𝐾−1
𝑘=1
+ 𝛽′�𝐼𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐼 ∗ 𝐶𝐺𝑗� + 𝛾′𝐹𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗 ,                                     (5) 
where 𝑑𝑖 and 𝜏𝑘 are industry and country fixed effects, respectively, 𝐼 and 𝐾 are the 
number of industries and countries, respectively, 𝑄𝑗 is firm 𝑗’s Tobin’s Q, 𝐶𝐺𝑗 is the 
(S&P, CLSA, or ISS) corporate governance rating; 𝐹𝑗 is a set of firm-specific control 
variables (sales growth, total assets, capital expenditures, ownership, leverage, cash 
holdings, PPE, foreign sales, and research and development; see, e.g., Durnev and Kim, 
2005; Aggarwal et al., 2009); 𝐶𝑘 is a set of country-level control variables (GNP per 
capita, stock market capitalization, and investor protection), and 𝐼𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐼 is a (3 ∗ 1) vector of 
competition dummies (strongly, softly, and weakly competitive industries). All variables 
are described in Table I. 
In Table VII, we report the estimates of equations (4) and (5). For developed countries, 
the relation between the corporate governance ratings and Tobin’s Q is positive and 
significant in softly and weakly competitive industries. For example, the coefficient on 
CG*softly competitive indicates that a one standard deviation increase in corporate 
governance rating in softly competitive industries is associated with a 0.43 increase in 
Tobin’s Q, a 22.10% increase over a developed countries sample mean of 1.93 (see 
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column (1) of Table VII). For strongly competitive industries from developed countries, 
we find no significant relation between corporate governance ratings and Tobin’s Q. 
These results extend to a wide set of developed countries the findings of  Giroud and 
Mueller (2011), who show that U.S. firms that benefit from good governance are from 
less competitive industries, which correspond to softly and weakly competitive industries 
in our setting. 
For developing countries, the corporate governance ratings are positively related to 
Tobin’s Q in all industries. However, firms that benefit more from higher ratings are 
located in strongly and softly competitive industries. In column (3) (see CG*strongly 
competitive), a one standard deviation increase in corporate governance rating in strongly 
competitive industries is associated with a 0.92 increase in Tobin’s Q, a 60.45% increase 
over the developing countries sample mean of 1.51. The magnitude of the impact of 
corporate governance ratings in softly competitive industries is lower; for one standard 
deviation increase in rating, Tobin’s Q increases by 0.65, a 43.17% increase over the 
developing countries sample mean. For weakly competitive industries, each standard 
deviation increase in corporate governance rating is associated with a 34.54% increase in 
Tobin’s Q over the sub-sample mean. The evidence suggests that the economic impact of 
good corporate governance increases with the level of competition in developing 
countries.  
[Insert Table VII about here] 
We next present the results using the ISS and CLSA samples in Table VIII.11 Panel A 
shows that the ISS governance ratings help explain Tobin’s Q only in weakly competitive 
industries. For a 9.54 increase in ISS rating (which is one standard deviation of the ISS 
governance ratings), Tobin’s Q increases by 0.19, a 10.54% increase over the sample 
mean of 1.81. The coefficients on the interaction terms between ISS governance ratings 
and competition dummies for strongly and softly competitive industries are not 
statistically significant. Further, the size of these coefficients is close to zero, which 
indicates that the impact is not economically significant in these industries either. The 
                                                            
11 As in the regressions based on the S&P sample, we lead Tobin’s Q by one year to reduce endogeneïty in 
the regressions based on the ISS and CLSA samples. 
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ISS results, which are similar to those reported using the S&P governance ratings, are 
consistent with Hypothesis IV for developed countries; that is, firms in less competitive 
industries benefit more from good governance than firms in strongly competitive 
industries. 
Panel B reports the results for the CLSA sample. For developing countries in the S&P 
sample, firms that benefit more from good governance are in strongly and softly 
competitive industries. For strongly (softly) competitive industries, a one standard 
deviation (i.e., 13.37) increase in CLSA governance rating is associated with a 3.60 
(3.20) increase in Tobin’s Q, a 184% (164%) increase over a sample mean of 1.96. For 
weakly competitive industries: each standard deviation increase in CLSA governance 
rating increases Tobin’s Q by only 47.75% over the sample mean (column (3)). These 
results are consistent with Hypothesis IV, which posits that for developing countries, the 
impact of corporate governance on firm value is greater in competitive industries. 
[Insert Table VIII about here] 
Endogeneity 
Above we address potential endogeneity of corporate governance using lagged values of 
the independent variables in the valuation regressions. To alleviate any further 
endogeneity concerns, we employ a system of simultaneous equations using three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) that allows for endogeneity between corporate governance and firm 
value. To do so, we need to identify an instrument for corporate governance that is 
unrelated to firm value. We use firms’ alpha and beta as instruments for corporate 
governance (Durnev and Kim, 2005). The values for alpha and beta come from 
Worldscope, and are computed using between 23 and 35 consecutive month-end 
percentage price changes relative to a local market index.  
Alpha captures the amount of returns not related to market factors, and therefore proxies 
for future expected excess returns. Higher values of alpha may induce a controlling 
shareholder to implement good corporate governance (Durnev and Kim, 2005). Hence, 
alpha should be positively related to corporate governance. Beta captures market risk, 
that is, the relation between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. The 
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literature suggests that higher market risk indicates more opportunities for insiders 
(managers and/or controlling shareholders) to profit from inside information (Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001; Durnev and Kim, 2005). We therefore expect beta to be negatively 
associated with corporate governance. 
We estimate the following system of equations: 
⎩
⎨
⎧
𝐶𝐺𝑗 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑗 + 𝜃1,1𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝜃1,2𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑗 + 𝜃1,3𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑗+𝜃1,4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 + 𝛾1′𝐹𝑗 + 𝛿1′𝐶𝑘 + 𝜀1,𝑗            𝑄𝑗 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝐼−1𝑖=1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐺𝑗 + 𝛾2′𝐹𝑗 + 𝛿2′𝐶𝑘 + 𝜀2,𝑗                                      ,                   (6) 
where 𝐶𝐺𝑗 is the S&P corporate governance rating, 𝑄𝑗 is firm 𝑗’s Tobin’s Q; 𝑑𝑖 represents 
industry 𝑖 fixed effects, 𝐼 is the number of industries, 𝐹𝑗 is a set of firm-specific control 
variables (sales growth, total assets, ownership, cash holdings, foreign sales, research and 
development), and 𝐶𝑘 is a set of country-level control variables (GNP per capita, stock 
market capitalization, and investor protection). For the governance equation, we include 
alpha, beta, the competition measure, and the dependence on external finance computed 
at the industry level.12 We do not include industry dummies in the governance equation 
since the dependence on external finance is constructed at the industry level and thus 
controls for industry characteristics. Furthermore, once included in the regressions, the 
coefficients on the industry dummy variables are not jointly significant (unreported 
results). This evidence suggests that the dependence on external finance and firm 
characteristics such as total assets, research and development, and foreign sales control 
for other industry characteristics that could explain corporate governance (see also 
Durnev and Kim, 2005). 
We report the results for the S&P corporate governance ratings in Table IX.13 Unlike in 
the previous estimations, in this analysis we divide the sample into two levels of 
competition to ensure we have enough observations in each regression as the inclusion of 
alpha and beta in the regressions reduces the sample of firms to 113 for developing 
countries and 288 for developed countries. Competitive (less competitive) industries are 
                                                            
12 We exclude capital expenditures and debt because they are not significant (see Table VI, Panel F). 
13 We obtain qualitatively similar results with the ISS and CLSA corporate governance ratings. 
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industries with competition measures above (below) the sample median of the empirical 
distribution for competition. The results, which are consistent with those in Tables V 
through VIII, show that competition is positively associated with governance ratings, but 
mostly in developing countries. Further, corporate governance is positively related to 
Tobin’s Q in competitive and less competitive industries in developing countries (see 
columns (6) and (8)), but only in less competitive industries in developed countries 
(columns (2) and (4)). Overall, addressing possible endogeneity through three-stage least 
squares regressions does not affect the evidence presented in this paper.  
[Insert Table IX about here] 
Sample selection bias 
The corporate governance ratings that we use in this study may induce several biases in 
the results. First, firms in countries with low economic and financial development or with 
weak investor protection may be less covered by the ratings because the ratings 
institutions (S&P, ISS and CLSA) could not finance their surveys in these countries 
(Doidge et al., 2007). In countries with less ratings covered (particularly developing 
countries), the relation between competition and corporate governance may be different 
than that reported here. However, our sample includes a balanced sample of countries 
from developed and developing countries. 
Second, larger firms are more likely to be covered by the S&P and CLSA ratings (Durnev 
and Kim, 2005; Doidge et al., 2007) as well as the ISS ratings (Doidge et al., 2007). This 
subjects the results in this paper to sample selection bias. To investigate whether this bias 
affects our findings, we estimate Heckman two-step selection models for firms in 
developed and developing countries. We collect data on all non-financial firms covered in 
Worldscope that are in countries covered by the ratings. We identify 9,477, 9,453, and 
5,561, firms for countries surveyed by S&P, ISS and CLSA, respectively. We repeat the 
estimation of equations (2) through (5) with the new data. The results (not reported) are 
similar to those presented in Tables IV through VIII, suggesting that sample selection 
bias does not affect our findings. 
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Overall, we find that in developed countries, corporate governance ratings are associated 
with an increase in firm value only in less competitive industries. These results extend the 
evidence of Giroud and Mueller (2011) for U.S. firms and Ammann et al. (2011) for 
countries from the European Union to a wide set of developed countries. These results are 
consistent with competition increasing managers’ effort to maximize firm value and 
thereby reducing the need for stronger governance (the managerial discipline effect), and 
with competition and corporate governance acting as substitutes. In developing countries, 
however, corporate governance ratings are related to an increase in firm value in 
competitive industries, suggesting that corporate governance might be an important issue 
in these countries, with competition and corporate governance acting as complements in 
encouraging value-maximization. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we empirically investigate the relation between competition and corporate 
governance ratings, how country characteristics influence this relation, and how this 
relation affects firm value. Using a multinational sample of firms domiciled in 38 
countries, we first show that product market competition is significantly related to 
governance ratings, but in a non-linear way. Further, the non-linearities vary with the 
level of economic development. For developed countries, firms from strongly 
competitive industries exhibit lower governance ratings than firms from weakly 
competitive industries. In contrast, for developing countries, firms from strongly 
competitive industries have higher governance ratings than firms from weakly 
competitive industries. 
We next investigate whether the effect of corporate governance on firm value depends on 
the level of product market competition. We find that corporate governance ratings are 
positively associated with firm value, but only in weakly competitive industries, and only 
for developed countries. For developing countries, the evidence suggests that corporate 
governance is valuable in strongly, softly, and weakly competitive industries. However, 
the magnitude of the impact of corporate governance on firm value appears to be greater 
in strongly competitive industries. This suggests that competition and corporate 
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governance complement each other in explaining firm value in developing countries, 
while they are substitutes in developed countries.  
Our findings have implications for corporate governance and firm valuation in 
developing countries. First, governments may consider the benefits of strengthening 
product market competition rather than imposing costly governance mechanisms on 
firms. Second, given that firms in competitive industries have good governance that 
improves their value; developing countries may accelerate the convergence of firm 
governance towards that of firms in developed countries by focusing on policies that 
intensify competition in the product market. 
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Table I: Variable Definitions and Sources 
   
Variables  Definition 
Panel A: Corporate Governance Variables 
Corporate governance 
ratings 
S&P S&P Transparency and Disclosure ratings issued in 2001 for year 2000 based on an examination of 98 disclosure requirements. A 
firm receives a value of one each time it meets one of these requirements and zero otherwise. The results from this examination are 
then converted into a percentage for each firm. 
CLSA Credit Lyonnais Security Asia (CLSA) governance ratings issued in 2001 for year 2000 for firms in emerging markets. The ratings 
are based on responses by financial analysts to 57 corporate governance questions. The responses are converted into a percentage 
for each firm. 
ISS Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) corporate governance quotients issued since 2003 for non-U.S. firms mostly in developed 
countries. The quotients are based on 55 governance attributes. For each attribute, a firm is given one or zero depending on whether 
it meets a threshold for the implementation of the attribute.  We retain only 44 attributes that are common to both U.S. and non-
U.S. coverage (Aggarwal et al., 2009). The results are converted into a percentage for each firm. 
Pane B: Industry-level Variables (two-digit SIC codes) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index 
HHI Sum of squared firms' market shares based on sales, computed at the industry level. Firm sales are from Bureau van Dijk Orbis. 
Competition Expressed as one minus HHI. 
Strongly competitive Dummy variable set to one if competition lies in the highest tercile of the competition distribution, and zero otherwise. 
Softly competitive Dummy variable set to one if competition lies in the middle tercile of the competition distribution, and zero otherwise. 
Weakly competitive Dummy variable set to one if competition lies in the lowest tercile of the competition distribution, and zero otherwise. 
Four firms’  
concentration ratio 
CONC Sum of the four largest firms’ market shares, constructed using firms sales from Bureau van Dijk Orbis. 
External financing Dependence on 
external finance 
Industry median of the five-year sum of capital expenditures minus the five-year sum of funds from operations divided by the five-
year sum of capital expenditures, computed for U.S. firms included in COMPUSTAT from 1995 to 2000; non-U.S. firms and U.S. 
firms are matched by two-digit SIC codes. 
Panel C: Country-level Variables 
Gross national 
product per capita 
Log GNP/capita Logarithm of annual gross national product per capita (World Bank Development Indicators, WDI). 
Investor protection Country investor 
protection 
Product of anti-director rights index (Djankov et al., 2008) and the rule of law index from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). 
Stock market 
capitalization 
Stock market 
capitalization/ GDP 
Stock market capitalization scaled by gross domestic product (Beck and Demirgüç-kunt, 2009), available from the World Bank. 
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Panel D: Firm-level Variables 
Lerner Index Price-cost margin Net income before extraordinary items (Worldscope 01551) to total assets (Worldscope 02999); we delete values below and above 
zero and one, respectively. 
Growth opportunities Sales growth Two-year geometric average of annual inflation-adjusted growth in net sales (Worldscope 01001), trimmed at the 1% level. 
Total assets Log(Assets) Logarithm of total assets (Worldscope 02999). 
Ownership Ownership Proportion of shares held by insiders (Worldscope 08021). 
Cash holdings Cash/Assets Cash and short-term investments (Worldscope 02001) divided by total assets (Worldscope 02999). 
International 
competition 
Foreign sales/ Total 
sales 
Foreign sales (Worldscope 07101) scaled by net sales (Worldscope 01001). 
Research and 
development 
R&D/Total sales Research and development (Worldscope 01201) normalized by net sales  (Worldscope 01001); we replace with zero when missing. 
American Depositary 
Receipt dummy 
ADR U.S. cross-listing dummy, which equals one if the firm is cross-listed on a major U.S. exchange (level 2 or 3 ADR); source: Bank 
of New York, Citibank, NYSE, NASDAQ, and JP Morgan. 
Excess returns Alpha A stock excess returns proxy (alpha, Worldscope item 09803) and a stock market risk proxy (beta, Worldscope item 09802) 
computed over 23 to 35 consecutive month-end percentage price changes relative to a local market index. Market risk Beta 
Capital expenditures Capital 
expenditures/Assets 
Capital expenditures (Worldscope 04601) divided by total assets (Worldscope 02999). 
Leverage Debt/Assets Total debt (Worldscope 03255) over total assets (Worldscope 02999). 
Property, plant, and 
equipment 
Property/Assets Property, plant, and equipment (Worldscope 02501) scaled by total assets (Worldscope 02999). 
Firm valuation Tobin’s Q Total assets (Worldscope 02999) plus market value of equity (Worldscope 08001) minus book value of equity (Woldscope 03501) 
over total assets (Worldscope 02999), trimmed at the 1% level. 
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Table II 
Summary Statistics for S&P Corporate Governance Ratings and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
This table reports summary statistics for the S&P corporate governance ratings and the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index, HHI, our 
primary competition measure. N, SD, Min, and Max are the number of sample firms, the standard deviation, the minimum, and the 
maximum, respectively. The data are for year 2000. 
Country N Corporate Governance Ratings Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
  
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Argentina 5 28.19 5.83 23.40 37.23 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.25 
Australia 20 61.14 7.25 44.90 71.28 0.38 0.25 0.08 0.99 
Austria 1 43.01 . 43.01 43.01 0.42 . 0.42 0.42 
Belgium 3 51.42 14.36 37.23 65.96 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.21 
Brazil 25 33.78 11.92 21.28 59.18 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.56 
Chile 16 31.09 10.96 15.22 54.26 0.39 0.17 0.17 0.66 
China 16 48.58 11.31 28.72 63.44 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.43 
Colombia 1 19.15 . 19.15 19.15 0.41 . 0.41 0.41 
Danemark 5 52.16 17.37 24.47 67.35 0.42 0.22 0.25 0.78 
Finland 4 75.69 5.87 70.65 84.04 0.33 0.22 0.18 0.66 
France 39 67.91 8.87 47.87 85.11 0.14 0.11 0.02 0.58 
Germany 24 55.90 9.66 38.78 73.12 0.24 0.19 0.02 0.63 
Greece 1 68.04 . 68.04 68.04 0.32 . 0.32 0.32 
Hong Kong 8 47.64 3.26 43.62 52.13 0.57 0.31 0.33 0.99 
India 36 38.65 10.36 20.21 62.37 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.60 
Indonesia 9 36.68 6.10 26.60 48.94 0.48 0.17 0.22 0.83 
Ireland 3 75.25 3.25 71.88 78.35 0.65 0.10 0.57 0.76 
Italy 14 58.58 10.41 42.55 73.47 0.18 0.13 0.02 0.35 
Japan 125 54.15 3.36 48.39 67.39 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.30 
Luxemburg 1 38.30 . 38.30 38.30 0.93 . 0.93 0.93 
Malaysia 36 45.34 7.16 35.11 62.77 0.21 0.17 0.04 0.63 
Mexico 15 24.36 9.03 15.22 51.61 0.26 0.14 0.10 0.67 
Netherlands 21 62.80 10.20 43.88 80.00 0.22 0.16 0.07 0.53 
New Zealand 1 55.91 . 55.91 55.91 0.92 . 0.92 0.92 
Norway 3 58.83 15.06 45.16 78.72 0.49 0.28 0.27 0.80 
Pakistan 8 39.76 6.55 32.98 48.94 0.42 0.26 0.24 0.94 
Peru 6 23.26 4.28 18.68 30.85 0.28 0.06 0.21 0.35 
Phillipines 3 29.85 11.94 12.24 37.76 0.48 0.27 0.27 0.79 
Portugal 5 55.00 9.83 41.49 64.95 0.22 0.18 0.04 0.51 
Singapore 6 59.80 5.86 50.00 65.31 0.32 0.25 0.12 0.65 
South Korea 32 46.92 12.98 5.21 62.89 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.33 
Spain 13 52.67 12.12 32.98 72.34 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.38 
Sweden 13 61.52 8.98 45.74 75.51 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.32 
Switzerland 11 53.84 12.45 38.04 71.28 0.42 0.28 0.18 0.83 
Taiwan 34 21.63 7.15 14.89 38.14 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.27 
Thailand 15 51.63 9.45 27.17 65.98 0.34 0.30 0.08 0.99 
United Kingdom 102 71.22 6.37 56.52 88.78 0.25 0.19 0.10 0.88 
Venezuela 2 30.65 17.49 18.28 43.01 0.89 0.14 0.79 0.99 
          Full sample 682 51.81 16.54 5.21 88.78 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.99 
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Table III 
Distribution of S&P Corporate Governance Ratings and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
This table reports the distributions of the S&P corporate governance ratings and our primary measure of competition, which is expressed 
as 1-HHI, where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of squares of firms’ industry market shares based on 
sales; firm sales come from Bureau van Dijk ORBIS. We identify an industry by its two-digit SIC code. Strongly, softly, and weakly 
competitive are subsamples of firms in industries with competition in the highest, middle, and lowest terciles of the empirical 
competition distribution. N, Mean, Min, and Max are the number of firms, the mean, the minimum, and the maximum of the variable, 
respectively. Mean Difference is the mean difference in S&P corporate governance ratings or competition between developing and 
developed countries. Developed (developing) countries comprise countries with GNP/capita above (below) the sample median, where 
GNP/capita is gross national product per capita and is from WDI. *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Corporate governance ratings (by competition terciles) 
  
Strongly  
competitive 
Softly  
competitive 
Weakly  
competitive Full sample 
Developed  
N 129 156 131 416 
Mean 56.35 62.82 60.77 60.17 
[Min  Max] [32.97   78.72] [37.23   85.10] [24.46  88.78] [24.46 88.78] 
     
 
Developing 
N 64 84 118 266 
Mean 45.51 40.73 36.96 40.21 
[Min  Max] [13.82  61.29] [5.21  65.97] [12.24  68.04] [5.21  68.04] 
      
 
Mean Difference 10.84*** 22.08*** 23.81*** 19.96*** 
Panel B: Competition (1-HHI) 
  
Strongly  
competitive 
Softly  
competitive 
Weakly  
competitive Full sample 
Developed  
N 129 156 131 416 
Mean 0.96 0.87 0.58 0.81 
[Min  Max] [0.92  0.99] [0.79  0.92] [0.01  0.79] [0.01  0.99] 
     
 
Developing 
N 64 84 118 266 
Mean 0.96 0.88 0.67 0.80 
[Min  Max] [0.92  0.99] [0.79  0.92] [0.01  0.79] [0.01  0.99] 
      
 
Mean Difference 0.00 -0.01** -0.09*** 0.01 
 
  
39 
 
Table IV :  
Product-market Competition and Corporate Governance 
The dependent variable in each regression is the S&P corporate governance ratings. Competition is expressed as 1-HHI, where HHI is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of squares of firms’ industry market shares based on sales; firm sales come 
from Bureau van Dijk ORBIS. We identify an industry by its two-digit SIC code. Firm-level variables are from Worldscope. Sales 
growth is inflation-adjusted sales growth winsorized at the 1% level; Dependence on external finance is from Compustat and is 
computed for U.S. firms in the same industry from 1995-2000 as capital expenditures minus cash flows from operations divided by 
capital expenditures; Log(Assets) is the log of total assets in U.S. dollars; Ownership is the proportion of shares held by insiders; 
Cash/Assets is cash holdings scaled by total assets; Foreign sales/Total sales is firm exports divided by net sales; ADR is a dummy 
variable set to one if the firm has a major U.S. exchange listing and zero otherwise; Country investor protection is the product of the 
anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) and the rule of law from ICRG; Stock market capitalization/GDP is a country’s 
stock market capitalization divided by gross domestic product and is from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009); and Developed 
(Developing) countries comprise countries with GNP/capita above (below) the sample median, where GNP/capita is gross national 
product per capita and is from WDI. Standard errors are robust to within-country variation; numbers in parentheses are student-t. *, 
**, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
    
Competition ×Developed countries  3.78 0.96 
  (1.33) (0.39) 
Competition ×Developing countries  9.41 6.89 
  (2.78)*** (3.17)*** 
Developed countries  10.85 8.55 
  (2.95)*** (5.79)*** 
Sales growth  1.30 0.86 
  (1.20) (0.89) 
Dependence on external finance  0.64 0.53 
  (1.43) (1.11) 
Log(Assets)  1.50 1.74 
  (3.54)*** (3.87)*** 
Ownership  -6.08 0.05 
  (-2.56)** (0.02) 
Cash/Assets  2.31 5.57 
  (0.50) (1.37) 
Foreign sales/Total sales  4.60 2.28 
  (2.49)** (1.18) 
ADR  3.75 4.09 
  (3.70)*** (3.30)*** 
Country investor protection  0.44  
  (4.13)***  
Stock market capitalization/GDP  3.40  
  (3.96)***  
    
Constant  4.77 0.99 
  (0.65) (0.14) 
    
Country fixed effects  no yes 
    
Adjusted R2  0.527 0.739 
Observations  499 499 
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Table V :  
Product Market Competition and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Country Characteristics  
The dependent variable in each regression is the S&P corporate governance ratings. Softly competitive and Weakly competitive are 
dummy variables set to one if competition lies in the middle or lowest tercile of the empirical competition distribution, and zero 
otherwise. Competition is expressed as 1-HHI, where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of squares of 
firms’ industry market shares based on sales; firm sales come from Bureau van Dijk ORBIS. We identify an industry by its two-digit 
SIC code. Firm-level variables are from Worldscope. Sales growth is inflation-adjusted sales growth winsorized at the 1% level; 
Dependence on external finance is from Compustat and is computed for U.S. firms in the same industry from 1995-2000 as capital 
expenditures minus cash flows from operations divided by capital expenditures; Log(Assets) is the log of total assets in U.S. dollars; 
Ownership is the proportion of shares held by insiders; Cash/Assets is cash holdings scaled by total assets; Foreign sales/Total sales is 
firm exports divided by net sales; ADR is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has a major U.S. exchange listing and zero 
otherwise; Country investor protection is the product of the anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) and the rule of law 
from ICRG; Stock market capitalization/GDP is the country’s stock market capitalization divided by gross domestic product and is 
from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009); Log GNP/capita is the log of gross national product per capita and is from WDI; and 
Developed (Developing) countries comprise countries with GNP/capita above (below) the sample median, where GNP/capita is gross 
national product per capita and is from WDI. Standard errors are robust to within-country variation; numbers in parentheses are 
student-t. *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Softly competitive 3.68 2.53 -14.63 -3.18 
 (2.73)** (2.46)** (-4.45)*** (-1.84)* 
Weakly competitive 1.23 2.30 -10.56 -2.31 
 (0.83) (1.87)* (-3.29)*** (-0.73) 
Sales growth 1.85 0.87 0.68 1.38 
 (0.74) (0.47) (0.17) (0.46) 
Dependence on external finance 0.65 1.54 0.88 0.45 
 (1.83)* (3.75)*** (1.01) (0.69) 
Log(Assets) 1.99 1.61 0.95 0.45 
 (4.57)*** (4.14)*** (1.03) (0.62) 
Ownership -8.57 -1.52 5.97 0.68 
 (-2.94)*** (-0.50) (1.31) (0.22) 
Cash/Assets 8.72 3.90 8.61 3.45 
 (1.94)* (1.11) (0.80) (0.44) 
Foreign sales/Total sales 5.86 2.46 4.71 4.35 
 (3.35)*** (1.87)* (0.93) (0.89) 
ADR 4.09 3.74 2.06 2.24 
 (4.56)*** (4.83)*** (0.84) (1.18) 
Country investor protection 0.61  0.88  
 (5.06)***  (3.76)***  
Stock market capitalization/GDP 0.22  7.46  
 (0.21)  (3.01)***  
Log of GNP/capita -14.61  0.34  
 (-4.33)***  (0.28)  
     
Constant 158.41 34.92 14.18 23.16 
 (4.33)*** (5.87)*** (0.90) (2.00)* 
     
Country fixed effects no yes no yes 
     
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.711 0.116 0.485 
Observations 339 339 160 160 
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Table VI :  
Product Market Competition and Corporate Governance: Robustness Tests  
The dependent variable in each regression is the S&P corporate governance ratings. Softly competitive and Weakly competitive are 
dummy variables set to one if competition lies in the middle or lowest tercile of the empirical competition distribution, and zero 
otherwise. Competition is expressed as 1-HHI, where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of squares of 
firms’ industry market shares based on sales; firm sales come from Bureau van Dijk ORBIS. We identify an industry by its two-digit 
SIC code. Firm-level variables are from Worldscope. Sales growth is inflation-adjusted sales growth winsorized at the 1% level; 
Dependence on external finance is from Compustat and is computed for U.S. firms in the same industry from 1995-2000 as capital 
expenditures minus cash flows from operations divide by capital expenditures; Log(Assets) is the log of total assets in U.S. dollars; 
Ownership is the proportion of shares held by insiders; Cash/Assets is cash holdings scaled by total assets; Foreign sales/Total sales is 
firm exports divided by net sales; ADR is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has a major U.S. exchange listing and zero 
otherwise; R&D/Total sales is the value of research and development expenditures divided by net sales; Capital expenditures and total 
debt are scaled by total assets; Country investor protection is the product of the anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) 
and the rule of law from ICRG; Stock market capitalization/GDP is the country’s stock market capitalization divided by gross 
domestic product and is from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009); Log GNP/capita is the log of gross national product per capita and is 
from WDI. DD and DG represent Developed and Developing countries, respectively; developed and developing countries comprise 
countries above and below the median GNP/capita, respectively. Panels A and B use alternative competition measures: the price-cost 
margin (i.e., Lerner index) and the four-firm concentration ratio. Panel C uses corporate governance ratings from Credit Lyonnais 
Security Asia (CLSA) and from Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS). Panel D uses firm and country data for year 1999. Panels E 
and F use firm data for year 2000 with industries defined at the three-digit and four-digit SIC code levels. Panel G includes as control 
variables R&D/Total sales (R&D), Capital expenditures/Assets (CAPEX), and Debt/Assets (DEBT). Panel H tests for a non-linear 
relation between competition and S&P corporate governance ratings using the raw competition measure. Standard errors are robust to 
within-country variation; numbers in parentheses are student-t. *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 Price-cost margin Four-firms  concentration ratio 
[?]Alternative governance  
ratings     
 DD DG DD DG ISS CLSA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     
  Softly competitive 1.81 -6.13 2.71 -4.10 2.91 -2.17 
 
(2.37)** (-2.55)** (2.48)** (-1.81)* (2.90)*** (-1.01) 
Weakly competitive 0.57 -5.27 0.31 -4.29 5.14 -6.32 
 (0.41) (-2.08)* (0.24) (-1.75)* (4.55)*** (-2.39)** 
Sales growth 1.62 -4.19 1.27 -3.55 0.65 0.53 
 (0.63) (-1.29) (0.51) (-1.06) (0.95) (1.86)* 
Dependence on external finance 0.63 1.12 0.51 0.96 0.27 2.66 
 (2.03)* (1.27) (2.01)* (1.05) (1.68) (2.73)** 
Log(Assets) 2.12 0.81 1.98 0.73 0.15 -0.75 
 (5.13)*** (0.91) (4.88)*** (0.81) (0.29) (-0.78) 
Ownership -9.99 3.90 -9.68 2.96 -0.08 0.02 
 (-3.46)*** (1.01) (-3.46)*** (0.76) (-5.16)*** (0.43) 
Cash/Assets 9.64 3.46 8.41 2.99 -5.94 7.67 
 (2.23)** (0.41) (1.96)* (0.33) (-4.13)*** (1.16) 
Foreign sales/Total sales 5.18 2.27 5.22 2.06 3.14 6.66 
 (2.99)*** (0.48) (3.04)*** (0.44) (2.06)* (2.40)** 
ADR 4.13 1.43 4.27 1.47 0.64 9.77 
 (4.61)*** (0.60) (4.88)*** (0.61) (0.48) (3.21)*** 
Country investor protection 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.53 0.41 0.56 
 (5.34)*** (2.90)** (5.46)*** (2.36)** (2.16)** (2.63)** 
Stock market capitalization /GDP 0.74 6.01 0.59 6.56 -0.47 3.02 
 (0.67) (2.83)** (0.58) (3.04)*** (-0.34) (1.37) 
Log GNP/capita -15.27 0.38 -15.05 0.11 -3.01 -0.58 
 (-4.41)*** (0.31) (-4.68)*** (0.09) (-0.54) (-0.38) 
       Constant 163.84 15.08 163.29 18.34 63.42 58.66 
 (4.42)*** (1.18) (4.66)*** (1.44) (1.11) (6.44)*** 
       Adjusted R2 0.416 0.091 0.425 0.075 0.324 0.248 
Observations 334 147 339 160 1530 232 
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Table VI (continued) 
 Panel D 
Two-digit SIC (year  1999) 
Panel E 
Three-digit SIC (year  
2000) 
Panel F 
Four-digit SIC (year  2000)  
 DD DG DD DG DD DG 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
Softly competitive 4.43 -11.35 3.76 -11.05 2.12 -1.47 
 (3.17)*** (-3.90)*** (2.69)** (-4.01)*** (1.78)* (-0.55) Weakly competitive 2.88 -10.92 2.95 -12.92 2.48 -7.03 
 (1.93)* (-3.78)*** (1.97)* (-4.26)*** (1.87)* (-2.38)** Sales growth 1.92 -2.18 4.05 -2.79 3.59 -4.25 
 (1.43) (-1.12) (1.38) (-0.70) (1.30) (-0.93) Dependence on external finance 1.05 1.25 0.76 -0.37 0.49 0.58 
 (2.51)** (1.55) (1.91)* (-0.45) (1.76)* (0.60) Log(Assets) 1.59 1.19 1.70 1.44 1.77 2.02 
 (3.91)*** (1.51) (3.79)*** (1.68) (4.13)*** (1.95)* Ownership -8.06 -3.59 -11.92 5.80 -15.52 4.00 
 (-2.89)*** (-0.76) (-3.81)*** (1.19) (-5.34)*** (0.71) Cash/Assets 10.37 4.35 9.83 3.70 11.87 8.20 
 (2.58)** (0.45) (1.98)* (0.32) (2.42)** (0.72) Foreign sales/Total sales 0.76 3.99 7.12 1.81 4.23 0.51 
 (1.45) (0.89) (3.73)*** (0.36) (2.25)** (0.10) ADR 5.38 2.05 4.20 1.71 4.46 1.87 
 (5.78)*** (0.82) (4.39)*** (0.69) (4.62)*** (0.67) Country investor protection 0.34 0.39 0.67 0.76 0.73 0.44 
 (2.61)** (1.74)* (4.63)*** (3.40)*** (2.87)*** (1.89)* Stock market capitalization/GDP 1.31 6.98 -0.22 7.20 0.50 7.86 
 (0.99) (3.03)*** (-0.21) (2.99)*** (0.48) (2.99)*** Log GNP/capita -13.99 -0.57 -13.39 1.20 -16.98 -0.55 
 (-3.41)*** (-0.49) (-3.25)*** (0.93) (-4.39)*** (-0.37) 
       Constant 165.70 29.42 154.54 1.92 190.84 3.88 
 (3.87)*** (1.96)* (3.58)*** (0.13) (4.77)*** (0.24) 
       Adjusted R2 0.362 0.086 0.395 0.114 0.378 0.095 
Observations 339 160 339 160 339 160 
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Table VI (continued) 
 Panel G 
CAPEX, DEBT,  R&D (year  2000) 
Panel H 
Non-linearity (year 2000)  
 DD DG DD DG 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) 
     
Softly competitive 4.08 -14.29   
 (3.04)*** (-4.26)***   Weakly competitive 1.87 -10.55   
 (1.27) (-3.18)***   Competition   11.06 -20.33 
   (1.85)* (-1.86)* 
Competition^2   -15.72 29.59 
   (-2.41)** (2.12)** 
R&D/Total Sales 33.50 -194.60   
 (2.08)* (-1.05)   
Capital expenditures/Assets -2.87 13.76   
 (-0.18) (0.59)   
Debt/Assets -0.12 9.47   
 (-0.04) (1.43)   
Sales growth 1.47 -0.52 1.23 -1.59 
 (0.61) (-0.13) (0.47) (-0.38) Dependence on external finance 0.32 0.93 0.87 1.11 
 (1.74)* (1.05) (2.00)* (1.22) Log(Assets) 2.06 0.56 1.80 1.48 
 (4.60)*** (0.59) (4.40)*** (1.58) Ownership -7.99 4.69 -9.29 3.93 
 (-2.73)** (1.02) (-3.08)*** (0.80) Cash/Assets 5.98 10.21 8.30 8.15 
 (1.37) (0.89) (1.90)* (0.70) Foreign sales/Total sales 5.36 5.71 1.74 1.11 
 (3.03)*** (1.14) (1.78)* (0.22) ADR 3.77 2.65 4.69 1.30 
 (4.26)*** (1.01) (5.29)*** (0.52) Country investor protection 0.62 0.84 0.55 0.74 
 (5.00)*** (3.60)*** (4.82)*** (2.94)*** Stock market capitalization/GDP 0.26 7.67 0.91 6.23 
 (0.24) (3.02)*** (0.88) (2.43)** Log GNP/capita -14.79 -0.09 -16.11 0.30 
 (-4.39)*** (-0.07) (-4.95)*** (0.22) 
     Constant 158.57 19.77 179.76 13.86 
 (4.33)*** (1.19) (5.24)*** (0.45) 
     Adjusted R2 0.424 0.113 0.424 0.107 
Observations 339 160 339 160 
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Table VII: 
Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and Valuation 
The dependent variable in each regression is Tobin’s Q, defined as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity 
divide by total assets. Strongly, Softly, and Weakly competitive are dummy variables set to one if competition lies in the highest, 
middle, or lowest tercile of the empirical competition distribution, and zero otherwise. Competition is expressed as 1-HHI, where HHI 
is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of squares of firms’ industry market shares based on sales; firm sales are 
from Bureau van Dijk ORBIS. We identify an industry by its two-digit SIC code. CG is the S&P corporate governance ratings. Firm-
level variables are from Worldscope. Ownership is the proportion of shares held by insiders; Sales growth is inflation-adjusted sales 
growth winsorized at the 1% level; Log(Assets) is the log of total assets in U.S. dollars; Capital expenditures/Assets is CAPEX scaled 
by total assets; Debt/Assets is total debt to total assets; Cash/Assets is cash holdings scaled by total assets; Property/Assets is PPE 
divided by total assets; Foreign sales/Total sales is firm exports divided by net sales; R&D/Total sales is the ratio of research and 
development expenditures to net sales; ADR is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has a major U.S. exchange listing and zero 
otherwise; Country investor protection is the product of the anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) and the rule of law 
from ICRG ; Stock market capitalization/GDP is the country’s stock market capitalization divided by gross domestic product and is 
from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009); Log GNP/capita is the log of GNP/capita and is from WDI. Developed and developing 
countries comprise countries above and below the median GNP/capita, respectively. Standard errors are robust to within-country 
variation; numbers in parentheses are student-t. *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CG *Strongly competitive 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.28 
 (1.63) (0.98) (2.37)** (8.75)*** 
CG *Softly competitive 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.23 
 (3.25)*** (2.12)** (2.34)** (4.39)*** 
CG *Weakly competitive 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.18 
 (2.33)** (1.51) (1.94)* (2.85)** 
Softly competitive -0.34 -0.07 1.70 0.67 
 (-0.52) (-0.15) (4.96)*** (0.64) 
Weakly competitive 0.83 1.37 1.67 4.54 
 (0.89) (1.78)* (1.48) (1.80) 
Ownership -0.45 -0.08 -0.75 -1.96 
 (-0.62) (-0.10) (-0.60) (-1.42) 
Sales growth 1.33 1.91 -3.11 -3.68 
 (1.53) (1.51) (-4.44)*** (-1.22) 
Log(Assets) -0.32 -0.36 -0.37 -0.52 
 (-4.48)*** (-2.67)** (-2.52)** (-1.11) 
Capital expenditures/Assets 2.97 1.25 12.13 50.91 
 (1.01) (0.46) (3.50)*** (6.07)*** 
Debt/Assets -0.35 -0.07 -3.46 -4.69 
 (-0.52) (-0.07) (-2.19)** (-1.84)* 
Cash/Assets 5.38 4.96 14.37 35.96 
 (2.17)** (3.05)*** (2.58)** (3.99)*** 
Property/Assets -0.01 0.16 1.05 2.52 
 (-0.02) (0.20) (0.45) (0.58) 
Foreign sales/Total sales -0.53 -0.89 2.05 0.59 
 (-0.76) (-1.36) (2.77)** (0.23) 
R&D/Total Sales 16.19 18.49 21.72 76.47 
 (2.54)** (3.01)*** (0.49) (1.35) 
ADR -0.02 0.05 0.39 1.61 
 (-0.17) (0.27) (0.74) (1.05) 
Country investor protection 0.01  0.11  
 (0.54)  (1.55)  
Stock market capitalization/GDP -0.01  0.59  
 (-0.07)  (0.38)  
Log GNP/capita -0.49  -0.83  
 (-0.67)  (-3.31)***  
     
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies no yes no yes 
     
Constant 9.06 4.53 4.89 -11.55 
 (1.12) (2.18)** (1.69) (-1.41) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.500 0.541 0.566 
Observations 309 309 144 144 
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Table VIII: 
Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and Valuation: CLSA and ISS Governance Ratings 
The dependent variable in each regression is Tobin’s Q, defined as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity 
divide by total assets. Strongly, Softly, and Weakly competitive are dummy variables set to one if competition lies in the highest, 
middle, or lowest tercile of the empirical competition distribution, and zero otherwise. Competition is expressed as 1-HHI, where HHI 
is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of squares of firms’ industry market shares based on sales; firm sales are 
from Bureau van Dijk ORBIS. We identify an industry by its two-digit SIC code. CG is either the ISS or CLSA corporate governance 
ratings. Firm-level variables are from Worldscope. Ownership is the proportion of shares held by insiders; Sales growth is inflation-
adjusted sales growth winsorized at the 1% level; Log(Assets) is the log of total assets in U.S. dollars; Capital expenditures/Assets is 
CAPEX scaled by total assets; Debt/Assets is total debt to total assets; Cash/Assets is cash holdings scaled by total assets; 
Property/Assets is PPE divided by total assets; Foreign sales/Total sales is firm exports divided by net sales; R&D/Total sales is the 
ratio of research and development expenditures to net sales; ADR is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has a major U.S. exchange 
listing and zero otherwise; Country investor protection is the product of the anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) and 
the rule of law from ICRG ; Stock market capitalization/GDP is the country’s stock market capitalization divided by gross domestic 
product and is from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009); Log GNP/capita is the log of GNP/capita and is from WDI. Developed and 
developing countries comprise countries above and below the median GNP/capita, respectively. Standard errors are robust to within-
country variation; numbers in parentheses are student-t. *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 Panel A : ISS governance Panel B : CLSA governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CG *Strongly competitive 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.22 
 (0.55) (0.10) (2.13)** (2.19)** 
CG *Softly competitive 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.25 
 (1.14) (0.03) (1.87)* (2.36)** 
CG *Weakly competitive 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.10 
 (3.29)*** (3.53)*** (1.87)* (1.75) 
Softly competitive 0.17 0.10 3.06 1.77 
 (1.66) (0.91) (0.68) (0.39) 
Weakly competitive 0.29 0.65 11.09 9.55 
 (1.12) (2.80)** (1.39) (1.94)* 
Ownership 0.01 0.10 3.35 6.50 
 (0.11) (0.99) (0.94) (1.90)* 
Sales growth 0.10 0.10 -2.59 -0.67 
 (1.51) (1.38) (-1.23) (-0.34) 
Log(Assets) -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 
 (-3.38)*** (-1.80)* (-0.21) (-0.08) 
Capital expenditures/Assets 3.39 3.15 -8.12 -2.59 
 (3.72)*** (3.62)*** (-0.57) (-0.28) 
Debt/Assets -0.21 -0.16 -2.33 1.75 
 (-1.48) (-1.08) (-0.47) (0.48) 
Cash/Assets 0.69 0.88 3.14 3.25 
 (1.91)* (2.46)** (0.40) (0.37) 
Property/Assets -0.44 -0.38 4.83 -2.99 
 (-3.14)*** (-2.92)*** (0.68) (-0.40) 
Foreign sales/Total sales 0.19 0.12 3.49 2.95 
 (1.62) (0.94) (1.38) (2.11)* 
R&D/Total Sales 3.68 3.94 6.86 -8.21 
 (3.62)*** (3.46)*** (0.26) (-0.94) 
ADR 0.19 0.17 3.47 4.09 
 (2.89)*** (2.56)** (1.03) (1.03) 
Country investor protection 0.01  0.10  
 (0.21)  (1.05)  
Stock market capitalization/GDP -0.09  -1.65  
 (-1.81)*  (-1.03)  
Log GNP/capita 0.07  -1.13  
 (0.47)  (-1.11)  
     
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies no yes no yes 
     
Constant 0.99 1.26 -11.22 -25.29 
 (0.65) (3.42)*** (-0.99) (-2.99)*** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.288 0.310 0.397 0.426 
Observations 1434 1434 203 203 
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Table IX: 
Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation: Three-Stage Least Squares 
The dependent variable in each regression is either the S&P corporate governance ratings (CG) or the firm Tobin’s Q defined as total 
assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divide by total assets. Competition is expressed as 1-HHI, where HHI is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of squares of firms’ industry market shares based on sales; firm sales are from 
Bureau van Dijk ORBIS. We identify an industry by its two-digit SIC code. Less competitive (competitive) comprise firms below 
(above) the median of the competition measure. Firm-level variables are from Worldscope. Sales growth is inflation-adjusted sales 
growth winsorized at the 1% level; Dependence on external finance is from Compustat and is computed for U.S. firms in the same 
industry from 1995-2000 as capital expenditures minus cash flows from operations divide by capital expenditures; Log(Assets) is the 
log of total assets in U.S. dollars; Ownership is the proportion of shares held by insiders; Cash/Assets is cash holdings scaled by total 
assets; Foreign sales/Total sales is firm exports divided by net sales; R&D/Total sales is the value of research and development 
expenditures divided by net sales; ADR is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has a major U.S. exchange listing and zero 
otherwise;  Alpha and Beta are measures of excess returns and market risk, respectively. Country investor protection is the product of 
the anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) and the rule of law from ICRG; Stock market capitalization/GDP is the 
country’s stock market capitalization divided by gross domestic product and is from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009); Log 
GNP/capita is the log of gross national product per capita and is from WDI. Developed and developing countries are subsamples of 
countries above and below the median gross national product per capita, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are student-t. *, ** and 
*** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
 Less competitive Competitive Less competitive Competitive 
 CG 
Equation 
Valuation 
Equation 
CG 
Equation 
Valuation 
Equation 
CG 
Equation 
Valuation 
Equation 
CG 
Equation 
Valuation 
Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Tobin’s Q 0.46  0.17  5.14  0.56  
 (0.29)  (0.21)  (1.51)  (0.37)  
CG  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.17 
  (2.19)**  (0.39)  (2.46)**  (4.53)*** 
Competition 8.12  -0.45  5.08  19.73  
 (2.11)**  (-0.04)  (0.48)  (2.85)***  
Sales growth 11.38 -0.37 -0.09 1.19 -17.15 0.49 5.95 -2.31 
 (2.10)** (-0.66) (-0.04) (1.87)* (-1.09) (1.57) (0.88) (-2.82)*** 
Dependence on external finance 0.79  0.27  0.23  3.23  
 (2.80)**  (1.77)*  (0.08)  (1.92)*  
Log(Assets) 4.58 -0.56 1.97 -0.35 3.60 -0.54 5.49 -0.86 
 (5.10)*** (-3.00)*** (3.48)*** (-1.49) (1.29) (-4.96)*** (2.90)*** (-3.74)*** 
Ownership -6.39 1.17 -2.22 0.09 -5.62 0.80 -0.80 2.76 
 (-1.28) (2.02)** (-0.59) (0.09) (-0.50) (1.51) (-0.08) (2.60)** 
Cash/Assets 9.44 1.20 8.46 2.87 -18.52 5.22 -3.09 -1.59 
 (0.66) (0.68) (1.73)* (1.80)* (-0.56) (5.19)*** (-0.14) (-0.49) 
Foreign sales/Total sales 7.94 -1.33 -0.19 -0.49 -14.77 -0.83 5.09 -0.68 
 (2.08)** (-2.73)*** (-0.26) (-3.05)*** (-1.21) (-1.27) (0.66) (-0.77) 
R&D/Total Sales 71.16 22.45 42.73 17.52 -412.64 -41.75 1,113.94 326.21 
 (1.23) (3.44)*** (1.53) (2.46)** (-0.92) (-0.58) (1.67) (2.82)*** 
ADR 3.67 -0.22 4.56 -0.42 -5.52 0.96 0.19 -0.05 
 (1.80)* (-0.76) (4.77)*** (-1.05) (-1.05) (3.82)*** (0.04) (-0.11) 
Alpha -0.04  0.47  0.31  3.86  
 (-0.02)  (0.95)  (0.18)  (0.92)  
Beta -4.15  1.84  -33.19  2.52  
 (-0.91)  (0.56)  (-1.74)*  (0.39)  
Country investor protection 0.53 -0.06 -0.83 -0.03 0.45 0.05 -0.05 -0.13 
 (2.47)** (-2.61)** (-3.33)*** (-0.31) (0.65) (1.50) (-0.13) (-2.06)** 
Stock market capitalization/GDP -0.47 0.11 21.68 0.83 9.30 -0.18 13.51 -0.36 
 (-0.44) (0.82) (7.30)*** (0.41) (1.78)* (-0.75) (1.97)* (-0.37) 
Log of GNP/capita -2.31 -0.15 7.03 -0.17 0.81 0.53 -0.73 0.37 
 (-0.50) (-0.29) (1.65) (-0.13) (0.21) (3.83)*** (-0.29) (0.84) 
         
Constant -12.15 9.83 -54.01 6.52 -23.89 0.70 -55.30 0.58 
 (-0.24) (1.84)* (-1.28) (0.54) (-0.55) (0.38) (-1.31) (0.11) 
         
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no yes no yes 
         
R2 0.50 0.53 0.69 0.48 0.37 0.75 0.49 0.59 
Observations 135 135 153 153 59 59 54 54 
 
 
